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Abstract
We study taxi markets in Singapore to understand market entry in the field.
While market entry games in the lab consistently produce equilibrium outcomes,
we show that a lack of market knowledge hinders the markets from consistently
reaching equilibrium in the field. In Singapore, a small 720-square-kilometre island
city that can be divided into 29 taxi markets, full equilibrium is elusive: 68% of
the market-entry decisions made by the 2,728 taxi drivers in our data could be
improved. Using three months of earnings and detailed movement data from these
taxi drivers, we find an average 20% gap in marginal wage rates across markets. We
use dynamic programming to derive the optimal solution for more than 3 million
search decisions and find that only 32% of the searches ended in an optimal mar-
ket. Finally, we find that market knowledge developed in a given month explains
an additional 3% variation of the earning losses in the 2.6 million decisions for the
subsequent two months, an improvement in model fit of 74%; while strategic think-
ing and minimization risk have no impact on earning loss.
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1 Introduction
Market-entry games in the lab offer a glimpse into how actual market entry in the field
may turn out. Lab results show that agents coordinate their entry decisions to achieve
equilibrium, almost magically (e.g. Rapoport et al., 1998, Erev and Rapoport, 1998).
However, the uncontrollable environmental factors and typically limited data availability
constrain a meaningful investigation into market entry in the field. Data availability and
the homogeneous environment of the taxi markets in Singapore make it a good example
for investigating how market entry works in the real world. The focus of this paper is in
identifying key factors that might cause disequilibrium in market entry in the field.
Taxi markets in Singapore resemble market-entry games in the lab in two important
ways. First, similar to market-entry games, demand and supply in the taxi markets are
simple when drivers and passengers are homogeneous. All drivers are equally competitive
and are the same to all passengers. In addition, all drivers earn the same amount from
the same passenger trip as all taxis use the government regulated fare structure; this fare
structure is common knowledge to all passengers. Drivers are not rated by passengers,
and passengers have no information to discriminate against any taxi for any trip. Second,
only drivers decide whether or not to enter the market. Demand is passive as passengers
wait at their locations and indicate their intention to hire when taxis approach. Drivers
are rewarded for choosing the market that offers a better chance of getting a passenger
quickly with a higher expected trip length, and hence effectively earning a higher “wage
rate.”
However, there are also two major differences between taxi markets and market-entry
games in the lab. First, as opposed to typical market-entry games where market sizes
are announced and are common knowledge, it may not be true that all drivers have suffi-
cient and relevant knowledge about all markets. Having sufficient and relevant knowledge
about taxi markets means that a driver knows the average search time for a passenger
and the average trip length for each market. These two pieces of information together
determine the expected payoff of a market at a particular time. Second, drivers make a
sequence of path-dependent entry decisions but have no say where they make the next
decision as the passenger decides the drop off location. Therefore, commonly available
trip-level data will not accurately capture the decision parameters facing a driver at each
decision point, and it is also important to know the movement path of a taxi when the
taxi is searching for a passenger. Our data consists of the location of a taxi at 15-second
intervals. During these intervals, we also know whether the taxi was available for hire.
This information allows us to identify decision points.
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Previous studies of the taxi market, such as Lagos (2003), Buchholz (2019) and
Frechette et al. (2019), relied on trip-level data to analyse spatial search but such data
had no information about the location of the taxis when the taxis were idle. These
researchers assumed drivers always chose the optimal entry decision, then calibrated a
general equilibrium model based on this assumption.1 Our dataset fills the research gap
using a 15-second data feed. This feed shows individual taxi location as well as the taxi’s
status (for hire or not-for-hire) during each time interval. Using the movement of vacant
taxis and comparing the profitability of locations, we examine how close taxi drivers are
to choosing the optimal market. Overall, the location- and time-specific data for each
taxi in our sample allow us to quantify the deviation of individual drivers from their
theoretical optimal path.
Taxi markets in Singapore also offer two modeling advantages. First, the city state
is a small island. Hence the markets have a natural and clear geographical boundary,
which results in fewer concerns about the entry and exit of taxis and passengers from
elsewhere. Second, where and when a driver starts and stops work during each shift is
fixed for most drivers. Without the need to decide where and when to stop work, the
daily decision-making tasks of a driver reduce to just market entry decisions.
We model the entry decisions at 5-minute intervals whenever a taxi is available for
hire. In particular, the moment a taxi is available for hire after the last drop-off is defined
to be a decision point, and thereafter every 5 minutes the taxi remains empty is also a de-
cision point. Using the 5-minute interval to define a decision point is reasonable because 5
to 10 minutes is all a taxi takes to travel across two neighbouring markets. We also define
the location of the taxi at a certain point to be the market choice of the last entry decision.
Our empirical investigation proceeds in two stages. First, we check for disequilibrium
by verifying whether there is an arbitrage opportunity between two markets. An arbi-
trage opportunity exists if the difference in wage rates between two markets is more than
the travel cost (friction). Drivers would have an incentive to incur the travel cost to move
from the low-wage-rate market to the high one and make a profit.2 Markets are not in
equilibrium if such arbitrage exists.3
1Other related papers examine workers’ ability to play the optimal strategy among professional ath-
letes. See Chiappori et al. (2002), Palacios-Huerta (2003), Romer (2006), Hall et al. (2017) and Chen et
al. (2017).
2We assume that the markets do not differ in dis-incentive caused by non-monetary features of a
market.
3We find such arbitrage does exist. For example, hourly wage rate was $8.77 in district 6 in June as
reported in Table A2 and wage rate in the neighboring 4 districts (4,5,7,8) ranged from $3.79 to $6.12;
while travel costs from these districts to district 6 were no more than $2.
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Second, we estimate the earning loss for each decision and find key factors that explain
why some decisions fare better than others. Specifically, we find that market knowledge
explains an additional 3% variation of the earning losses in the 2.6 million decisions, a
74% improvement in model fit, establishing the necessary condition for coordination for
market entry in the field. On the other hand, strategic thinking and risk preference does
not have any significant impact on earning loss. In fact, more than 85% of the decisions
made are non-strategic; there is no incentive to be strategic as there is little risk of over-
entry in the better-paying markets. In summary, we hope to add to the understanding
of the drivers’ suboptimal decisions, and to use this information to inform interventions
that will increase earnings and improve social welfare, see Cramer and Krueger (2016).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
Section 3 provides comments on driver behaviors. Section 4 presents empirical evidence
on the disequilibrium. Section 5 lays out a dynamic programming model for a driver’s
optimal decision, and Section 6 presents the empirical evidence for the driver’s deviation
from the optimal solution, quantifies earning loss, and describes factors that mitigate the
loss. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
The data contains the locations and statuses of 2,728 taxis at 15-second intervals over
a three-month period, from April to June 2014, in Singapore. The data covers a total of
146,071 work shifts worked by the 2,728 taxi drivers and contains a total of 588,764 GPS
location points. The taxis used in this study represented approximately 10% of all taxis
in the city.4 An in-vehicle console, acting as a control panel for the taxi driver, captured
both the location (via GPS) and status (on break, looking for a passenger, passenger on
board) of the taxi. The information was transmitted to the taxi company roughly every
15 seconds. The transmission ended when a driver signed out of the console at the end
of the work shift. This data is augmented with driver-specific information about driver
demographics, income, and employment history obtained from the taxi company. Panels
A and B of Table 1 list the summary statistics of the driver demographics, daily earnings,
and vehicle status.
We reduced the unnecessary granularity of the original data via two methods. First,
as we were interested in taxi drivers’ search behavior, we only kept the location and time
data for the origin and destination of a passenger trip, and removed the location data
4These 2,728 taxis belonged to the same company, were of similar models and were driven by drivers
who were recruited and trained under the same system. The drivers received the same services such as
maintenance, insurance, and call booking from the company.
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between the two ends of each trip. We did the same for breaks taken by the drivers
as well. Second, we needed to define markets of a reasonable size to perform a mean-
ingful analysis. The 720 square kilometers of Singapore are divided into 28 districts for
city-planning purposes, and the population density in each district does not vary too
drastically from that of the others. In addition, the airport is a unique and interesting
location with a non-local source of passengers that forms a market of its own. Hence,
we found it reasonable to use the district system together with the airport to create 29
markets for our analysis. As it takes between 5 and 10 minutes to drive from a district
to a neighboring district, it was sufficient that we aggregated the times when a taxi was
searching for passengers into 5-minute intervals and used the ending district to repre-
sent its location during each 5 minutes. This market division is comparable to that in
Frechette et al. (2019) and Buchholz (2019).
Formally, we define a market as a district d in a 5-minute interval t. The demand
arising from each market is defined by three parameters: the (expected) number of trips
originating in the district in the 5-minute interval, a 29 by 29 transition matrix that
records the proportion of the trips going from each district to the 29 districts (including
the trips within districts), and a vector of the average lengths (in minutes) of trips to
each of the 29 districts. These parameters largely capture any locational characteristics
relevant to the expected revenue from the respective markets. Operationally, we aver-
aged the number of pick-ups in each district for each 5-minute interval (288 intervals in
a day) across 91 days. We computed the vectors of average trip lengths and vectors of
trip proportions for the 29 markets using a 30-minute window separately for weekdays
and weekends. We used the 30-minute window for these vectors because the data would
have been too sparse if we had used a 5-minute window. The 30-minute window still
offered a reasonable approximation of varying demand conditions due to traffic and peak
periods. We divided the number of pick-ups by the total number of taxis in the market
to produce a pick-up rate. Table A1 summarizes the average trip length and the pick-up
rate for each market. The average pick-up rates across markets range from 8% to 35%,
and the market average trip-time ranges from 12 to 21 minutes.
We calculate taxi fares at the individual-trip level by using the GPS driving records
and validate our calculation with the daily total earnings data collected by the company.
To do so, we translated all the expected trip times into dollar values by using the adver-
tised trip-fare formula. We assumed the average driving speed was 50 km/h and used a
driving-time formula of 36 cents per 45 seconds, then added a base fixed fare of S$3.2.
If the starting district was the airport, a base S$3 surcharge was added; if the starting
district was the airport, on Friday, Saturday or Sunday, between 17:00 and 00:00, an
additional S$2 was added. For weekdays (Monday through Friday) between 06:00 and
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09:30, the dollar value was increased by 25%; for all days from 18:00 to 00:00, the dollar
value was increased by 25%; for all days from 00:00 to 06:00, the dollar value was in-
creased by 50%.
Although our analysis was based on a randomly drawn a sample of 10% of the taxis
in the market, we verified the representativeness of this 2014 sample using the trip level
data of the entire taxi population for the period of April to June 2015. The trip-level
data consists of fare, origin market, destination market, departure time, and arrival time
for each trip. The data covers the entire taxi population of Singapore, but we do not
have the 15-second location and status data to model the search path of an empty taxi.
Using this 2015 trip-level data, we tested the hypotheses that the proportion of trips in
each market and the corresponding trip lengths in our sample were no different from the
population. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution tests (p value > 0.2) suggested that
we could not reject the hypothesis that the sample statistics are no different from the
population statistics. The detailed results are provided in the Figure A1 in the appendix.
3 Driver Behavior
Taxi drivers make two types of decisions in their daily work shift: their working hours
and the locations they search after passenger drop-offs. Previous studies of taxi-driver
labor supply, such as Camerer et al. (1997), Crawford and Meng (2011), Farber (2008),
and Thakral and Tô (Forthcoming), discussed whether taxi drivers were more likely to
end shifts earlier if they achieved their target incomes. However, a large proportion of
taxi drivers have a fixed work schedule in Singapore, so only search decisions are relevant
to most drivers in Singapore.
To generate supporting evidence using our data, we plot the distribution of deviation
from the personal average starting and ending times for taxi drivers in the left panel of
Figure 1. After excluding the drivers who switched between morning and night shifts
(4% of the total number), we find that 78.2% of taxi shifts started within an hour of the
driver’s average starting time, and 70.6% of shifts ended within an hour of the drivers’
average ending time. This finding is not surprising because about 60% of taxis are two-
shift taxis, with a day-time regular driver who passes the taxi to a relief driver for the
night shift at a pre-arranged time and location. We further split the left panel of Figure
1 into the regular drivers (Figure A2) and relief drivers (Figure A3). Deviations in both
figures are similar to those in Figure 1.
Almost all the drivers in our data also kept the same starting and ending locations
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in most, if not all, of their work shifts. We plot drivers’ starting and ending locations
in the right panel of Figure 1, and confirm that almost all drivers returned the taxis to
the locations from which they started their shifts. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that
both the times and locations to start and end a shift are known by the driver ahead of
the shift.
4 Arbitrage Opportunity
The expected hourly wage rates at every hour for any two districts should be quite
similar in equilibrium.5 Any significant difference between an arbitrary pair of districts
beyond the friction cost of traveling between the pair, namely the amount of time and
fuel cost for a taxi in the lower-wage-rate district to move to the higher-wage-rate district
would present an arbitrage opportunity. If such arbitrage opportunities are present, then
the markets are likely in disequilibrium assuming all drivers are income maximizing. We
show in reduced form below that such arbitrage opportunities were present in our data.
To estimate the hourly wage rate of each district, we regress the daily earnings of
a driver on the amount of work time the driver spent in each district in each hour of
the shift. Let Yis denotes the earnings of driver i in shift s, and Tisd denote the amount
of work time (in a fraction of an hour) that driver i spent during shift s in district d
(d = {1, 2, · · · , 29}). There are a total of 29 work-time variables. Work time is defined as
the time spent searching for passengers (FREE) and the time with a passenger on board
(POB). We attribute the entire POB time to the district the trip originated from. Figure
2 shows that a typical driver spent more than 40% of their work time searching for a
passenger in any given hour.6





where Dis accounts for the fixed effects due to driver i (such as the driver’s age and
driving experience) and the fixed effects due to shift s (such as day of the week); εis is
the remaining random error assumed to be i.i.d. over i and s.
5We assume that all drivers only care about maximizing their hourly wage rate. There might be
preference for non-monetary payoffs where some drivers may have preferences for certain district char-
acteristics. As long as these preferences are driver-specific and randomly distributed across drivers, this
statement about equilibrium is still valid as there will still be drivers who arbitrage.
6We calculate the taxi-search-time fraction of each hour using search time divided by total active
work time (in “POB” or “FREE” status). To show how passenger trips are distributed geographically,
we show the number of drop-offs and pick-ups by districts in Figure A4.
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The corresponding regression coefficients βd approximate the marginal hourly wage
rates in district d. With 2,728 drivers each working 78 shifts in the 91 days, we have
220,056 rows of data to estimate the 29 marginal hourly wage rates. We plot the average
regression coefficients βd by district in Figure 3.
7 The conservatively estimated difference
between the highest and lowest rates is S$6.1 per hour (S$8.2 - S$2.1). For an eight-hour
shift, this comes to at least S$48.8.
In addition to estimating the regression on all 91 days, we also estimate three separate
regressions for the three months. The detailed results are included in Table A2 in the
appendix. There was no reduction in differences across markets and the marginal wage
rates across the months for the same market remained similar. We repeated the analysis
separately for both regular and relief drivers; the estimates are reported in Table A3.
While the higher wage rates for relief drivers reflected a 50% late-night surcharge for the
night shift, the differences across markets were there and remain across the three months
for both driver types.
These reduced-form results suggested that the markets are not in equilibrium nor is
there any sign of convergence. Contrary to common assumptions in prior literature about
spatial competition in the taxi market (e.g. Buchholz, 2019), we do not think drivers,
in general, follow optimal search routes throughout their work shifts. We believe the
markets were in disequilibrium because drivers failed to optimize some of their search
decisions. Our data contains the detailed dynamic search decision of each driver to allow
us to check our conjecture. We model the dynamic search sequences of the drivers, derive
the optimal search decisions, and compute the loss in earnings if the actual decisions are
suboptimal.
5 Optimal Entry Decisions
We find optimal solutions to all entry decisions and contrast them with the actual de-
cisions by the drivers to find the exact arbitrage opportunities. Each entry decision would
have an impact on all subsequent decisions for a shift. Hence, finding the optimal entry
decision requires finding optimal market entries for subsequent decisions as well. Due to
this recursive nature of optimal decision, we use dynamic programming to solve for the
optimal entries for the entire decision sequence for a shift. We develop the formula below.
7We have also estimated the marginal hourly wage rates at 3-hour intervals. In other words, we
defined the independent variables Tistd where t = 1, ..., 8 indicating the eight 3-hour intervals, generating
a total of 232 βtd (29 districts by 8 intervals). Figure A5 plots the marginal hourly wage rates for the
eight intervals.
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Assuming fixed ending locations and end-times for the daily shifts of each driver, we
model the daily search decisions of the driver with two indices, time period t and market
d. Suppose the daily shift of a driver is broken down into T discrete periods, which are
5-minute intervals in our empirical analysis. Without loss of generality, we set the first
5-minute interval of all drivers to be the first 5 minutes starting from midnight such that
t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 288}.
In each time period t, a working driver i can face one of the two passenger states:
FREE to pick up a passenger (passenger state = 0) or passenger on board, POB
(passenger state = 1). We define the cumulative values for the respective states as
V 0i (t, d) and V
1
i (t, d). If the driver faces passenger state = 0, he faces a decision about
which market to go to. The expected value of going to market d′ from market d is the
weighted values of the two states that the driver will face in market d′ as follows:
Wi(t, d, d
′) = σ(t′, d′)V 1i (t
′, d′) + (1− σ(t′, d′))V 0i (t′, d′),
where
• t′ = t + λ(t, d, d′) is the time period that a driver arriving in market d′ starts in t
from market d.
• σ(t, d) is the likelihood that a taxi picks up a passenger in district d in period t
which is estimated in 5-minute windows every day in every district.8
• λ(t, d, d”) is the average trip time from district d to district d” in period t. Two sets
of trip-time matrices are computed using 30-minute windows, one for weekdays and
one for weekends. We assume the same trip time for each 5-minute period within
a 30-minute window.
With the expected values Wi(t, d, d
′) for all d′, the driver i chooses the market that
gives the highest value and this maximum is the value of passenger state = 0, where the
decision is made. Formally,
V 0i (t, d) = maxd′∈∆it{Wi(t, d, d′), ∀d′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 29}},
where ∆it is the set of markets that include the ending location and ending time of driver
i as a feasible end point. In other words, the set contains all markets that can reach the
8Although the pick-up rate is endogenous to entry decisions, a driver’s individual entry decision would
have no significant impact on the denominator of the pick-up rate, because there are close to 30,000 taxis
in Singapore, or an average of about 1000 taxis per district.
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ending location D by ending time T , ∆it = {d′ : t′ + λ(t′, d′, D) ≤ T}.
The expected value for the state of “passenger on board” consists of two components.
The first component is the value generated from the passenger trip itself and the sec-
ond is the expected value of going to the destination market d′.9 Summing all possible
destination markets, the total expected value can be found using:
V 1i (t, d) = {
∑
d′∈∆it




• θ(t, d, d′) is the proportion of trips transiting from district d to district d′ in period
t. Similar assumptions to those for λ(t, d, d”) are used for the computation of the
transition matrices for weekdays and weekends.
• ψtd is the fixed component and φtd is the variable component of the fare structure.
Every trip starts with a fixed fee of $3.2 but some charges may be specific to a
particular time (such as the peak-hour rate) or a particular location (such as the
fixed airport surcharge) or both.
Using the above dynamic programming structure, we can determine a driver’s optimal
search decision at every search point through backward induction. The value functions
of market d for both states in the last period are
V 1i (T, d) = {
∑
d′∈∆iT
θ(T, d, d′)[ψTd + φTdλ(T, d, d
′)]},
and V 0i (T, d) = 0. The value functions for prior periods can then be recursively backed
out.
Using the dynamic programming formulation above, we solved the optimal decision
at every decision point for all shifts. To provide a glimpse of how actual choices deviated
from optimal decisions, we mapped out the dyads, (chosen market, optimal market), for
three different relatively more busy time periods: 7 - 9 a.m., 12 - 2 p.m. and 5 - 7 p.m.10
The plots are in Figure 4. The off-diagonal bubbles are the suboptimal entry decisions.
Some districts seemed to persistently attract too many drivers as shown in the big bub-
bles in the lower diagonal section of Figure 4.11 We explore the factors that drove these
9We do not include fuel cost into the calculation as the car engine is always running regardless of
passenger state in Singapore.
10Plots for the remaining time periods can be requested from the authors.
11Focusing on market 29 (where Changi airport is located), we observed large concentrations of both




We define the earning loss of a decision by driver i in period t and district d, Li(t, d).
It is the value of the best decision i could make minus the value of the decision i actually
makes, as follows:
Li(t, d) = V
0
i (t, d)−Wi(t, d, di)
where di is the actual choice of driver i.
Table 1 lists the summary statistics comparing the driver’s working patterns and daily
income. The average age of drivers was 54.7 and, on average, they had been with their
respective taxi companies for 2.4 years. The average daily income (gross revenue from
taxi fare) was S$201.40. Consistent with the anecdotal evidence that a large proportion
of taxi drivers had a fixed working schedule, we indeed found that 63% of drivers in our
sample were relief drivers who took night shifts. Each shift lasted 456 minutes on average
and of those 456 minutes, drivers spent an average of 135 minutes actively searching for
a passenger. We then listed the model-predicted optimum income and loss per shift for
each type of driver. If a driver followed the optimal search path for the entire shift, we
classified the potential maximum earning of that shift as an optimal earning. Each driver
on average lost S$46 in a shift, which accounted for 17% of their potential income and
22% of their actual income. Regular and relief drivers had similar optimal earnings and
aggregated earning losses per shift (see Panel C of Table 1); both regular and relief drivers
achieved only about 80% of their potential income.
In Table 2, we focus on earning loss at the individual decision level. We find that only
32% of the 3,930,884 location decisions are optimal. If we define the close-to-optimal
search decisions as those with earning losses smaller than S$0.10, still only 34% of deci-
sions were close to optimality. If we consider S$1 per decision as economically significant,
nearly 50% of search decisions generate significant earning losses. The average earning
loss per decision is S$1.69, which is consistent with the shift-level loss calculated in Table
(where market 29 was chosen but not optimal) in Figure 4. Ho et al. (2020) offered an explanation for
such phenomenon. Working on the same dataset, they found that not enough drivers were staying after
dropping off passengers at the airport and many drivers who went empty left empty; trips from the
airport were longer but not taken into account by drivers who cared about the long taxi queue. Both are
the reasons why we observe the off-diagonal horizontal and vertical strings of bubbles for market 29 in
Figure 4. Drivers who did not stay at the airport on average earned S$4.40 less than those who stayed.
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1.
The standard deviation in the daily earning loss across drivers is large, at S$33 (see
Table 1), which suggests a large variation in earning loss among drivers. Why are some
drivers better than others at choosing the right markets to enter? We investigate three
obvious possibilities. First, the lack of market knowledge may hinder optimal decision
making because market knowledge provides the key parameters into the entry decisions
for a driver. Second, the drivers might not be strategically minded or otherwise able
to take into account other drivers’ entry decisions. Third, drivers might exhibit non-
monetary preferences such as preference towards local trips or aversions to risky markets
nearby; this could potentially dampen the drivers’ incentives to chase for better wage
rates in the other markets.
We empirically test the impact of these three driver-specific characteristics (market
knowledge, strategic thinking and market preference) through the use of the following
regression:
Li(t, d) = γZi + ζXit + δDtd + εitd, (1)
where Zi represents aforementioned driver-specific characteristics, Xit (e.g. cumulative
working time), Dtd accounts for district and time specific market conditions (such as the
pick-up probability and number of phone bookings) and the fixed effects due to time of
the decision t (such as day of the week and drivers’ starting hours); εitd is the remaining
random error assumed to be i.i.d. We also apply the regression model to regular drivers
and relief drivers separately.
We construct proxy measures from the driving behaviors of the drivers for the re-
gression analysis. We include two proxy measures for Xit. As a measure of fatigue, we
use cumulative work-time up to the decision point. Fatigue is more likely to set in when
the driver drives for a longer time; this will likely lead to more suboptimal decisions and
greater earning losses. Thus, we expect the coefficient to be positive. We include the
cumulative earnings up to the decision point to test the target income hypothesis. In par-
ticular, higher cumulative earnings lead to lower motivation to make optimal decisions;
so we expect the coefficient to be positive.12
12Target income hypotheses from earlier literature suggested that a driver stopped work when he
reached his target income. We did not observe a high variation in stopping time as we noted in Figure
1, so stopping time would not be a good dependent variable to test the target income hypothesis. We




Market experience and knowledge improve productivity (see Haggag et al., 2017) and
remove anomalies (see List, 2003). In particular, Haggag et al. (2017) found taxi drivers’
productivity improved by accumulating neighborhood-specific experience. We use the
“familiarity of a market” as a proxy for the market knowledge and define the familiarity
of a market as the proportion of working time a driver spent in each market in April.
On the other hand, the work experience of a driver, as indicated by the number of years
being a taxi driver, might not offer a good measure of market knowledge because of the
constantly evolving nature of cities. For instance, new subway lines, new offices, and new
shopping centers may be built. However, we still include the work experience variable as
a control. For each decision, we include two knowledge measures, the driver’s “familiarity
with the optimal market(s)” and “familiarity with the present market(s)” at the decision
point. We expect a higher familiarity leads to a lower loss of earnings for the decision
concerned. Thus, we expect both measures to have a negative coefficient.
Two driver behaviors that are unique to the Singapore taxi markets might affect the
entry decisions of a driver. We discuss both in this subsection because they may po-
tentially be proxies for market knowledge. We include them in the model but do not
attribute their model-fit contribution to market knowledge. First, some drivers prefer
running short trips. These trips are usually the last-mile trips such as the subway-to-
home trips and the local-market-to-home trips that happen in the residential districts.
We construct a measure for this “short trip preference.” Specifically, we define it to be the
percentage of work-time a driver spent in the 14 short-trip-generating markets.13 This
captures not only the preference but also the knowledge a driver may have that comes
from serving the markets with higher demand for short trips. Hence, one can argue that
it is a proxy for market knowledge as well; and we expect the coefficient to be negative
as better knowledge leads to less loss.
Second, most taxi drivers typically hang out with other buddy drivers for lunch at
their usual joints. Anecdotally, they share market information during these lunch breaks,
and so drivers may be more knowledgeable about some markets after their lunch breaks.
We define an indicator variable that indicates whether the decision is before a break.
Based on this, we expect the coefficient to be positive because decisions before a break
are more likely to lead to a loss.
13We compute the average trip length originating from each market using data from the month of




Taking competition into account is important in making better decisions. The neglect
of competition led to crowded markets, e.g. Moore et al. (2007), Simonsohn (2010). The
presence of strategic thinking (Crawford et al., 2013) or strategic intelligence (Levine
et al., 2017) was significant in explaining better market entry decisions (e.g. Goldfarb
and Yang, 2009, Goldfarb and Xiao, 2011) and better business decisions in general (e.g.
Hortaçsu et al., 2019, DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019). These decisions are high stakes,
infrequent, and have the luxury of time for a careful evaluation. For the taxi drivers,
decisions are low stakes, frequent, and need to be made on the go. Nevertheless, the ef-
fort to engage in strategic thinking may be important in explaining the decisions of some
taxi drivers. Similar to previous studies of market entry decisions, we organize the dif-
ferent levels of efforts using the cognitive hierarchy framework as in Camerer et al. (2004).
For the remainder of this subsection, we describe how the strategic effort level of each
driver is determined from the data and how proxy measures for strategic thinking of a
driver are derived. Conceptually, a level-0 driver exerts minimal effort by randomizing
across all feasible markets. A level-1 driver chooses the market with the best payoff,
assuming all other drivers accessing the same set of markets to be level-0. In general, a
level-k driver best responds assuming others to be lower than level-k.
When considering which market to enter, a level-k driver (k ≥ 1) considers two quan-
tities associated with each market d in period t: the expected number of trips originating
from market d in period t, N(t, d); and the expected fare for a trip originating from mar-
ket d in period t, F (t, d). N(t, d) is estimated by averaging the number of trips originating
from the market d for a 5-minute interval t using all 91 days in the data set. Using the
parameters of the trip time from d to d′ (λ(t, d, d′)), the fixed and variable components
of the fare (ψtd, φtd), and weighted by the proportion of trips transiting from d to d
′
(θ(t, d, d′)), we form the expected fare from choosing market d in period t14:
F1(t, d) = {
∑
d′
θ(t, d, d′)[ψtd + φtdλ(t, d, d
′)]}.
More importantly, the level-k driver would consider how many other drivers (of lower
levels) choose to enter each market which is embodied in the probability of getting a
ride. Let Ek(t, d
′) be the probability for level-k to get a ride in the market d′ in period
t after taking into account the entry decisions of lower levels. Using the square bracket
14We use F1 to denote the mean fare and F2 to denote the variance.
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notation [d] to indicate the driver’s location in market d when making decision in period
t, a level-k driver located in market [d] chooses to enter the market Dk(t, [d]) in period t
if it gives the best expected fare. Formally,
Dk(t, [d]) = argmaxd′∈∆[d]{F1(t, d
′) · Ek(t, d′)},
where
• Ek(t, d′) is computed using the estimated number of trips and the entry decisions




• Sk−1(t, d′) is the cumulative number of drivers (level k − 1 and below) who choose
to enter market d′ in the period t.
• ∆[d] = {d′ : the neighbouring markets to market [d], [d] inclusive} is the set of all
markets that are adjacent to market [d] where the driver is located. In the data, we
find that over 96% of entry decisions are indeed made in ∆[d] as drivers largely look
for passengers in the adjacent areas. Some non-adjacent markets are not reachable
within 5 minutes while other markets may have noticeably high friction costs that
even level-0 drivers would not consider (minimum aversion of level-0 as noted in
Chong et al. (2016)).
And the cumulative number of drivers up to level k selecting market d in period t is
derived as follows:





{I[Dl(t, [d′]) = d; d ∈ ∆[d′]] ·M(t, [d′])},
where the number of level-k drivers choosing market d are aggregated across the markets
[d′] they are located at; and
• πl is the proportion of drivers with level-l effort. We use a Poisson distribution with
a mean of τ to approximate the distribution of effort level.
• I[condition] is an indicator function for the condition.
• M(t, [d]) is the number of drivers located at market [d] in period t. M(t, d) is
estimated by averaging the number of drivers with passengers on board and those
searching for passengers in the market d for a 5-minute interval t using all 91 days
in the data set.





M(t, [d′]) for d ∈
∆[d′]. The level-0 drivers located in market [d
′] randomize over all markets in ∆[d′].
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We derive two proxy measures of strategic efforts for each driver, share of level-0
decisions and share of level ≥ 1 decisions, to capture the non-strategic and strategic pro-
portions of the driver decisions. We determine the effort level for the 3,930,884 decisions
by comparing them to the level-k decisions (i.e. Dk(t, [d])). If a search decision is only
consistent with level-0 thinking, we classify it as a level-0 decision. If a decision is consis-
tent with both level-0 and level-1, we classify it as level-1, and similarly for all level k ≥ 2
decisions. For decisions consistent with level-k and above, we classify these decisions as
level ≥ k.
We start with the Poisson mean τ = 1.5 to classify the entry decisions and find
that close to 85% of the decisions are level-0 decisions. We then revise the mean to
τ = 0.165 so that it better reflects the high percentage of level-0 decisions. The results
of the classification for both τ = 1.50 and τ = 0.165 are reported in Panel A of Table
3. Strategic thinking is not common as no more than 11% of the decisions are level
≥ 1 decisions. Less than 4% of the decisions are non-adjacent markets not covered by
the model and hence are not classified. We categorize the decisions of a driver into
three clusters: level-0, level ≥ 1 , not classified; shares of decisions are then computed.
Consistent with our knowledge measures, we use all decisions made by a driver in April to
compute the value of two proxy measures. These form the second group of driver-specific
characteristics Zi in Equation 1.
6.3 Risk Preference
Some drivers may be averse to risky markets and opt to minimize fluctuations in earn-
ings over time rather than to maximize their expected income. We considered two possible
risk-minimizing decision rules: 1) choose the market that has the least (mean-adjusted)
variance in earnings and 2) choose the market with the highest pick-up probability. We
compute the shares of decisions made by a driver using these rules and use them as proxy
measures for the risk preference of the driver. We provide the details of these computa-
tions in the remainder of this subsection.
We formalize the two decision rules as follows. Let F2(t, d) be the variance of fare
for trips originating from market d in period t, where F1(t, d) is mean fare. The decision
that follows the minimum mean-adjusted variance rule is:






and the decision that follows the highest pick-up probability rule is:
Dp(t, [d]) = argmaxd′∈∆[d]{E(t, d
′)}.
We derive two proxy measures of risk preference for each driver: share of variance-
minimizing decisions and share of pick-up-probability-maximizing decisions. For each
decision, we compute the mean-adjusted earning variance and the pick-up probability for
all adjacent markets where the driver was located. We count the decisions that coincided
with the minimum of the mean-adjusted earning variance and the maximum of the pick-
up probability and compute the respective decision shares. The result of this classification
exercise is reported in Panel B of Table 3. We do not find the drivers to be very risk
averse as only 14.9% of decisions are the minimum mean-adjusted earning variance and
24.3% of decisions are the maximum pick-up probability. Consistent with the knowledge
and strategic effort measures in the last two subsections, we use all decisions made by a
driver in April to compute the value of the two proxy measures. These form the third
group of driver-specific characteristics Zi in our regression specification of Equation 1.
6.4 Empirical Results
We regress Equation 1 using data from May to June while using the April data to es-
timate the driver-specific characteristics proxy measures on market knowledge, strategic
thinking and risk preference. Table 4 reports the estimation results for all drivers and for
regular and relief drivers separately. Details of the coefficients for the driver-specific char-
acteristics Zi and for a driver’s continuous status throughout a shift (cumulative earnings
and cumulative working time up to a decision point) Xit are reported at the significance
level of p < 0.01.
Cumulative-working-time is positively significant, suggesting fatigue is likely to be
a cause for suboptimal decisions, especially for relief drivers working night shift. Con-
trary to our target income prediction, cumulative-earnings is significant at -0.0444 for
all drivers, which was equivalent to a S$0.044 decrease in loss as a driver doubles her
accumulated earnings in a daily shift. The effect, though small in magnitude, differs by
driver shift-type; the marginal effect of cumulative earning is -0.0269 for regular drivers
and doubles at -0.0541 for relief drivers. This result suggests that when a driver has
higher earnings up to the decision point, she is less likely to make a suboptimal decision.
Familiarity with optimal-markets is significant at -4.1309, which means that a driver’s
earning loss would decrease by S$0.413 if a driver was 10% more familiar with the opti-
mal district, which would account for a 24% reduction in average earning loss. Compared
to the coefficient (-0.6112) for familiarity-with-current-market, familiarity-with-optimal-
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market is 6 times more impactful. Short-trip-preference is also significant with the ex-
pected sign at -0.6026, indicating that a driver’s earning loss would be S$0.060 lower if she
preferred to have 10% more short trips. Decision-before-a-break is positively significant
at 0.0327 overall. It is significant at 0.0621 for the regular drivers, suggesting that the
search decisions made before a break were likely to cost a driver more in earnings com-
pared to other decisions. However, it is insignificant for relief drivers, which is consistent
with the fact that many relief drivers might be driving the night shifts and hence were
less likely to have coordinated breaks.
The coefficients for both level-0 share and level ≥ 1 share are significantly negative,
although not significantly different from each other. This result highlights the difference
in earning loss between adjacent markets and non-adjacent markets, but not between
strategic and non-strategic decisions. Given that most decisions are level-0, a consis-
tent hypothesis is that it does not pay to be strategic and hence most drivers remained
non-strategic. Finally, risk preference does not explain the earning loss as both proxy
measures for risk preference are not statistically significant.
We find that earning loss could be explained by (a lack of) market knowledge but
not by (a lack of) strategic thinking nor by risk preference. Overall, the inclusion of
driver-specific characteristics to the baseline model explains an additional 3.54 percent-
age points of the variation in earning loss, increasing from 4.49% to 8.03% to produce
a 78.8% improvement. The addition of the market knowledge measures alone increase
the regression fit from 4.49% by 3.32 percentage points to 7.81%, improving the fit by
73.9% for more than 2.6 million decisions in the months of May and June.15 The addition
of strategic thinking and risk preference measures improve fit by 0.27 percentage points
(driven mainly by the classification of non-adjacent market choices), a 6% improvement
over the baseline model.16
7 Conclusion
Unlike the consistent equilibrium outcomes for market-entry games in the lab, field
evidence from the taxi markets in Singapore reveals significant disequilibrium. This dise-
quilibrium manifests itself in gaps among marginal wage rates across the markets. These
differences in the marginal wage rate reflect the imbalances in taxi supply across the
markets that result from suboptimal market entry decisions by some drivers.
15Detailed estimation result including market knowledge is reported in the appendix Table A4.
16Detailed estimation result including strategic thinking and risk preference is reported in the appendix
Table A5
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We investigate three possible reasons for the suboptimal decisions: insufficient knowl-
edge about the markets, insufficient attention to competition and idiosyncratic prefer-
ences for some markets. The earning losses are reduced if the drivers are familiar with
the relevant markets at a decision point; strategic thinking and risk preference have no
effect. Market knowledge explained an additional 3% of the variation in earning losses
for the 2.6 million decisions, resulting in a 73.9% improvement in fit.
Our analysis points to the lack of market knowledge of individual drivers as an impor-
tant cause for the suboptimal decisions that led to the existence of arbitrage opportunities.
Our empirical results suggest that the drivers did learn from their own past experience,
and they were able to use the limited market knowledge learned, where and when it was
relevant, to avoid earning losses. Most drivers were not strategic in their decisions and
being strategic did not reduce earning loss, but simply avoiding non-adjacent markets
did. Avoiding risky markets or choosing safe markets neither increased nor decreased
earning loss. In summary, our work empirically validates that market knowledge is a
crucial first step toward realizing the magic of coordination in the taxi markets.
We envision that as more and more drivers take advantage of the arbitrage oppor-
tunities by making optimal entry decisions while upgrading and updating their market
knowledge, the magic of coordination will emerge when market knowledge stabilizes and
arbitrage opportunities are competed away.17 And it is perhaps only then that the drivers
would become strategic because the likelihood of over-entry in some markets increases.
To validate this equilibration process convincingly requires a larger dataset in a stable
market environment (both conditions are currently luxury). Alternatively, a centralized
booking system for all drivers may also achieve the coordination function, removing the
need for market knowledge and strategic thinking, and reducing the earning fluctuation.
17The pickup probabilities are endogenous. As drivers optimize and change their entry decisions,
pickup probabilities will correspondingly change leading to changes in optimal entries; this is when
strategic thinking becomes important. And the cycle continues until the equilibrium is achieved.
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Table 1: Taxi Drivers and Vehicle Status, Actual and Counter-factual Income
(1) (2) (3)
N Mean S.D.
Panel A Drivers’ demographics
Age (in years) 2,728 54.7 8.57
Work experience (in years) 2,728 2.42 2.50
Income (S$ per day) 146,071 201.41 87.42
Relief driver proportion 2,728 0.63 0.48
Panel B Vehicle status
Total work time (minutes) 146,071 456 208
Search time (minutes) 146,071 135 86
Break time (minutes) 146,071 75 95
Passenger on board (minutes) 146,071 246 140
Panel C Per shift
All Driver
Daily loss in income (S$ per day) 128,957 46.16 33.01
Optimum income (S$ per day) 128,957 268.79 108.67
Number of search decisions 128,957 46.00 28.56
Regular Driver
Daily loss in income (S$ per day) 55,785 43.84 31.86
Optimum income (S$ per day) 55,785 263.34 108.38
Number of search decisions 55,785 42.89 26.24
Relief Driver
Daily loss in income (S$ per day) 73,172 47.92 33.76
Optimum income (S$ per day) 73,172 272.92 108.42
Number of search decisions 73,172 48.38 29.99
Note: All earnings and losses are measured in Singapore dollars and time
related variables are measured in minutes. Vehicle status data include all
driving records. Shift level summary statistics include all day and night
shifts and exclude shifts with irregular lengths.
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Table 2: Optimal Proportion and Earning Loss per Search Decision
(1) N (2) Mean
All Driver
Loss = $0 1,268,831 32.28%
Loss < $0.1 1,338,557 34.05%
Loss < $0.5 1,627,383 41.40%
Loss < $1 2,003,177 50.96%
Average loss 3,930,884 $1.69
Regular Driver
Loss = $0 522,123 33.66%
Loss < $ 0.1 549,801 35.44%
Loss < $0.5 663,089 42.74%
Loss < $1 808,792 52.14%
Average loss 1,551,314 $1.68
Relief Driver
Loss = $0 746,708 31.38%
Loss < $0.1 788,756 33.15%
Loss < $0.5 964,294 40.52%
Loss < $1 1,194,385 50.19%
Average loss 2,379,570 $1.71
Note: Loss is defined as the difference between the
option value of a driver’s actual search decision and
the option value of the driver’s best search decision.
All losses are measured in Singapore dollars.
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Table 3: Decision Classification by Strategic Effort and by Risk Preference
Panel A: Strategic Thinking
τ = 0.165
Level 0 decision 3,366,249 85.64%
Level 1 decision 15,955 0.41%
Level ≥ 1 decision 384,049 9.77%
Level 2 decision 10,745 0.27%
τ = 1.5
Level 0 decision 3,332,197 84.77%
Level 1 decision 66,012 1.68%
Level ≥ 1 decision 333,992 8.50%
Level 2 decision 44,797 1.14%
Decisions not classified 153,886 3.91%
Panel B: Risk Preference
Minimum mean-adjusted earning variance 586,024 14.91%
Maximum pick-up probability 955,435 24.31%
Note: We classify search decisions by levels of drivers’ strategic effort in Panel A.
Drivers who make level-0 decision randomly choose among all markets adjacent to
his current location. Level ≥ 1 decisions are decisions shared by level-1 and above.
Decisions not classified are the choices of non-adjacent markets.
We classify search decisions by two risk-minimizing decision rules in panel B: decisions
which coincide with the minimum mean-adjusted earning variance and decisions
which coincide with the maximum pick-up probability among the adjacent markets.
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Table 4: Earning Loss with Market Knowledge, Strategic Thinking and Risk Preference
Dependent Variable Earning loss at decision level
All Drivers All Drivers Regular Relief
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Familiarity with optimal market -4.1309∗∗∗ -3.8153∗∗∗ -4.3630∗∗∗
[0.1700] [0.2219] [0.2477]
Familiarity with current market -0.6112∗∗∗ -0.7139∗∗∗ -0.5529∗∗∗
[0.0456] [0.0678] [0.0600]
Level 0 decision -4.4550∗∗∗ -5.1983∗∗∗ -4.1051∗∗∗
[0.3038] [0.4762] [0.3787]
Level ≥ 1 decision -4.0179∗∗∗ -4.6668∗∗∗ -3.9237∗∗∗
[0.5199] [0.7151] [0.6927]
Earning risk minimizing decision -0.0766 -0.0745 -0.0451
[0.1929] [0.3196] [0.2394]
Pick-up prob. maximizing decision -0.8599∗∗ -1.1150∗∗ -0.5605
[0.4061] [0.5639] [0.5614]
Short-trip preference -0.6026∗∗∗ -0.7104∗∗∗ -0.5370∗∗∗
[0.0747] [0.1094] [0.1001]
Current cumulative working time (log) -0.0022 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
[0.0024] [0.0025] [0.0036] [0.0035]
Current cumulative earning (log) 0.0073∗ -0.0444∗∗∗ -0.0269∗∗∗ -0.0541∗∗∗
[0.0043] [0.0045] [0.0068] [0.0060]
Decision before a break 0.0615∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0621∗∗∗ 0.0158∗
[0.0063] [0.0071] [0.0103] [0.0094]
Total number of phone bookings -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗
[0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Experience, age and education controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pick-up probabilities Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of week and starting hour FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,604,432 2,604,432 1,039,133 1,565,299
R-squared 0.0449 0.0803 0.0835 0.0787
Note: The estimation sample includes all observations from May to June. Data in April are used to derive
the driver-specific characteristics. Familiarity variables are defined as percentage time the driver spent in
each district in April. Level-k decision variables are proportions of the driver’s decisions in April corresponding
to level-k. Similarly, the earning-risk-minimizing-decision variable and the pick-up-probability-maximizing
-decision variable are the proportions the driver’s decisions in April corresponding to earning-risk-minimizing
decision and pick-up-probability-maximizing decision respectively. Pick-up probability and phone bookings
are controlled at both current and optimal markets. Clustered standard errors by drivers are shown in
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Hortaçsu, Ali, Fernando Luco, Steven L Puller, and Dongni Zhu, “Does strate-
gic ability affect efficiency? Evidence from electricity markets,” American Economic
Review, 2019, 109 (12), 4302–42.
Lagos, Ricardo, “An analysis of the market for taxicab rides in New York City,” Inter-
national Economic Review, 2003, 44 (2), 423–434.
Levine, Sheen S, Mark Bernard, and Rosemarie Nagel, “Strategic intelligence:
The cognitive capability to anticipate competitor behavior,” Strategic Management
Journal, 2017, 38 (12), 2390–2423.
List, John A, “Does market experience eliminate market anomalies?,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 2003, 118 (1), 41–71.
Moore, Don A, John M Oesch, and Charlene Zietsma, “What competition?
Myopic self-focus in market-entry decisions,” Organization Science, 2007, 18 (3), 440–
454.
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, “Professionals play minimax,” The Review of Economic
Studies, 2003, 70 (2), 395–415.
Rapoport, Amnon, Darryl A Seale, Ido Erev, and James A Sundali, “Equi-
librium play in large group market entry games,” Management Science, 1998, 44 (1),
119–141.
29
Romer, David, “Do firms maximize? Evidence from professional football,” Journal of
Political Economy, 2006, 114 (2), 340–365.
Simonsohn, Uri, “eBay’s crowded evenings: Competition neglect in market entry deci-
sions,” Management science, 2010, 56 (7), 1060–1073.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Average Trip Length and Pick-up Probability
Time 6:00-23:59 Time 0:00-5:59 Travel Cost/Friction
District Mean trip Pick-up Mean trip Pick-up Minimum Maximum
length (min) probability length (min) probability S$ S$
1 15.1 26.3% 15.0 18.3% 0.6 5.6
2 17.2 24.2% 16.4 16.4% 0.6 5.6
3 15.7 29.3% 14.1 21.1% 0.7 7
4 18.4 22.9% 16.8 15.6% 0.5 6.5
5 17.5 26.8% 14.9 11.5% 0.6 6.6
6 15.0 33.0% 14.2 25.5% 0.8 7.4
7 15.4 28.4% 13.1 17.9% 0.7 6.8
8 16.5 23.4% 13.5 11.9% 0.6 5.3
9 15.5 35.2% 14.4 24.7% 0.8 7.8
10 15.6 31.9% 14.2 17.9% 0.8 7.5
11 17.2 34.9% 15.3 23.4% 0.8 6.9
12 16.2 31.0% 13.1 19.2% 0.7 6.5
13 17.0 35.1% 13.9 21.9% 0.8 6.9
14 16.3 32.3% 12.5 15.1% 0.8 6.7
15 15.4 30.2% 13.2 16.5% 0.7 7.3
16 16.8 26.7% 13.0 13.2% 0.6 5.8
17 20.0 27.4% 16.3 16.9% 0.7 7.1
18 15.9 27.5% 12.4 12.8% 0.7 6.3
19 16.5 22.2% 12.0 10.8% 0.5 6.0
20 16.5 22.7% 12.7 8.7% 0.5 6.0
21 19.6 27.4% 16.3 12.5% 0.7 6.1
22 17.1 23.3% 13.1 10.8% 0.6 6.3
23 18.7 20.1% 14.3 8.4% 0.5 4.9
24 18.6 9.6% 12.5 6.8% 0.2 2.9
25 18.7 20.1% 14.5 8.0% 0.5 5.1
26 21.0 31.3% 15.9 18.3% 0.8 7.7
27 18.3 19.1% 13.9 7.3% 0.5 4.3
28 19.3 23.8% 15.2 12.5% 0.6 5.5
29 23.7 9.2% 18.3 7.8% 0.2 2.4
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Table A2: Average Marginal Earnings across Districts by Month
Dependent variable Hourly earnings (dollar)
(1) April (2) May (3) June
Work time in D1 6.350∗∗∗ 6.552∗∗∗ 6.643∗∗∗
[0.180] [0.176] [0.172]
Work time in D2 5.302∗∗∗ 6.168∗∗∗ 5.921∗∗∗
[0.319] [0.303] [0.269]
Work time in D3 3.905∗∗∗ 3.734∗∗∗ 3.752∗∗∗
[0.139] [0.143] [0.140]
Work time in D4 4.535∗∗∗ 4.685∗∗∗ 4.355∗∗∗
[0.168] [0.177] [0.173]
Work time in D5 4.114∗∗∗ 4.194∗∗∗ 4.081∗∗∗
[0.155] [0.166] [0.166]
Work time in D6 7.664∗∗∗ 8.261∗∗∗ 8.770∗∗∗
[0.367] [0.397] [0.409]
Work time in D7 6.117∗∗∗ 6.311∗∗∗ 6.121∗∗∗
[0.203] [0.221] [0.220]
Work time in D8 3.691∗∗∗ 3.599∗∗∗ 3.791∗∗∗
[0.215] [0.224] [0.207]
Work time in D9 7.060∗∗∗ 7.282∗∗∗ 7.358∗∗∗
[0.171] [0.177] [0.183]
Work time in D10 5.311∗∗∗ 5.428∗∗∗ 5.521∗∗∗
[0.161] [0.173] [0.170]
Work time in D11 4.308∗∗∗ 4.529∗∗∗ 4.630∗∗∗
[0.170] [0.176] [0.180]
Work time in D12 4.063∗∗∗ 4.054∗∗∗ 4.099∗∗∗
[0.171] [0.170] [0.166]
Work time in D13 4.082∗∗∗ 4.349∗∗∗ 3.739∗∗∗
[0.241] [0.271] [0.238]
Work time in D14 3.811∗∗∗ 3.674∗∗∗ 3.999∗∗∗
[0.145] [0.147] [0.148]
Work time in D15 5.469∗∗∗ 5.521∗∗∗ 5.793∗∗∗
[0.185] [0.192] [0.187]
Work time in D16 3.368∗∗∗ 3.774∗∗∗ 3.627∗∗∗
[0.129] [0.137] [0.133]
Work time in D17 2.665∗∗∗ 2.986∗∗∗ 3.111∗∗∗
[0.162] [0.178] [0.168]
Work time in D18 3.664∗∗∗ 3.908∗∗∗ 3.864∗∗∗
[0.152] [0.146] [0.143]
Work time in D19 3.165∗∗∗ 3.168∗∗∗ 3.409∗∗∗
[0.130] [0.133] [0.132]
Work time in D20 2.657∗∗∗ 2.490∗∗∗ 2.585∗∗∗
[0.132] [0.136] [0.128]
Work time in D21 4.338∗∗∗ 4.373∗∗∗ 4.448∗∗∗
[0.243] [0.257] [0.260]
Work time in D22 2.953∗∗∗ 3.056∗∗∗ 3.150∗∗∗
[0.120] [0.117] [0.122]
Work time in D23 2.700∗∗∗ 2.759∗∗∗ 2.959∗∗∗
[0.139] [0.151] [0.158]
Work time in D24 1.106∗∗ 3.608∗∗∗ 2.129∗∗∗
[0.430] [0.882] [0.667]
Work time in D25 2.770∗∗∗ 2.774∗∗∗ 2.834∗∗∗
[0.154] [0.163] [0.162]
Work time in D26 3.081∗∗∗ 3.573∗∗∗ 3.857∗∗∗
[0.273] [0.306] [0.316]
Work time in D27 2.399∗∗∗ 2.167∗∗∗ 2.508∗∗∗
[0.159] [0.159] [0.164]
Work time in D28 3.618∗∗∗ 3.689∗∗∗ 3.717∗∗∗
[0.353] [0.345] [0.344]
Work time in D29 3.065∗∗∗ 3.088∗∗∗ 3.634∗∗∗
[0.140] [0.144] [0.145]
Observations 378,410 363,791 391,709
R-squared 0.119 0.121 0.121
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Table A3: Average Marginal Earnings across Districts by Month
Dependent variable Hourly earnings (dollar)
Regular Driver Relief Driver
(1) April (2) May (3) June (1) April (2) May (3) June
Work time in D1 5.847∗∗∗ 5.798∗∗∗ 5.907∗∗∗ 6.902∗∗∗ 7.293∗∗∗ 7.365∗∗∗
[0.252] [0.235] [0.234] [0.254] [0.257] [0.248]
Work time in D2 5.014∗∗∗ 5.141∗∗∗ 5.112∗∗∗ 5.657∗∗∗ 7.167∗∗∗ 6.718∗∗∗
[0.420] [0.423] [0.375] [0.475] [0.421] [0.379]
Work time in D3 2.998∗∗∗ 2.820∗∗∗ 2.875∗∗∗ 4.933∗∗∗ 4.728∗∗∗ 4.703∗∗∗
[0.170] [0.180] [0.177] [0.221] [0.223] [0.213]
Work time in D4 3.779∗∗∗ 3.608∗∗∗ 3.505∗∗∗ 5.353∗∗∗ 5.795∗∗∗ 5.213∗∗∗
[0.228] [0.233] [0.226] [0.240] [0.260] [0.260]
Work time in D5 3.307∗∗∗ 3.330∗∗∗ 3.301∗∗∗ 5.025∗∗∗ 5.147∗∗∗ 4.937∗∗∗
[0.198] [0.224] [0.227] [0.235] [0.234] [0.231]
Work time in D6 6.361∗∗∗ 6.649∗∗∗ 8.127∗∗∗ 8.880∗∗∗ 9.819∗∗∗ 9.381∗∗∗
[0.521] [0.588] [0.530] [0.499] [0.492] [0.602]
Work time in D7 4.955∗∗∗ 5.086∗∗∗ 4.987∗∗∗ 7.300∗∗∗ 7.468∗∗∗ 7.203∗∗∗
[0.262] [0.297] [0.297] [0.296] [0.315] [0.315]
Work time in D8 3.136∗∗∗ 2.816∗∗∗ 3.091∗∗∗ 4.256∗∗∗ 4.352∗∗∗ 4.496∗∗∗
[0.308] [0.286] [0.296] [0.299] [0.340] [0.288]
Work time in D9 6.182∗∗∗ 6.186∗∗∗ 6.015∗∗∗ 7.911∗∗∗ 8.319∗∗∗ 8.659∗∗∗
[0.230] [0.244] [0.243] [0.249] [0.247] [0.262]
Work time in D10 4.590∗∗∗ 4.567∗∗∗ 4.705∗∗∗ 6.051∗∗∗ 6.328∗∗∗ 6.395∗∗∗
[0.210] [0.238] [0.227] [0.244] [0.242] [0.246]
Work time in D11 3.294∗∗∗ 3.564∗∗∗ 3.562∗∗∗ 5.541∗∗∗ 5.540∗∗∗ 5.841∗∗∗
[0.209] [0.237] [0.235] [0.250] [0.257] [0.267]
Work time in D12 3.314∗∗∗ 3.086∗∗∗ 2.983∗∗∗ 4.823∗∗∗ 5.016∗∗∗ 5.279∗∗∗
[0.223] [0.213] [0.211] [0.259] [0.265] [0.247]
Work time in D13 3.184∗∗∗ 3.659∗∗∗ 2.803∗∗∗ 5.031∗∗∗ 5.053∗∗∗ 4.667∗∗∗
[0.310] [0.397] [0.317] [0.360] [0.366] [0.359]
Work time in D14 2.974∗∗∗ 2.777∗∗∗ 3.475∗∗∗ 4.695∗∗∗ 4.585∗∗∗ 4.544∗∗∗
[0.182] [0.183] [0.183] [0.222] [0.226] [0.232]
Work time in D15 4.361∗∗∗ 4.519∗∗∗ 4.706∗∗∗ 6.724∗∗∗ 6.567∗∗∗ 6.912∗∗∗
[0.236] [0.252] [0.244] [0.272] [0.280] [0.277]
Work time in D16 2.631∗∗∗ 2.821∗∗∗ 2.856∗∗∗ 4.187∗∗∗ 4.806∗∗∗ 4.469∗∗∗
[0.170] [0.181] [0.174] [0.188] [0.196] [0.194]
Work time in D17 1.849∗∗∗ 2.352∗∗∗ 2.411∗∗∗ 3.558∗∗∗ 3.627∗∗∗ 3.896∗∗∗
[0.217] [0.257] [0.220] [0.231] [0.246] [0.254]
Work time in D18 3.154∗∗∗ 3.329∗∗∗ 3.142∗∗∗ 4.227∗∗∗ 4.521∗∗∗ 4.636∗∗∗
[0.192] [0.194] [0.185] [0.238] [0.216] [0.215]
Work time in D19 2.481∗∗∗ 2.423∗∗∗ 2.824∗∗∗ 3.905∗∗∗ 3.948∗∗∗ 4.035∗∗∗
[0.175] [0.176] [0.189] [0.186] [0.195] [0.184]
Work time in D20 1.866∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗ 1.885∗∗∗ 3.537∗∗∗ 3.364∗∗∗ 3.355∗∗∗
[0.177] [0.176] [0.165] [0.185] [0.202] [0.192]
Work time in D21 3.460∗∗∗ 3.796∗∗∗ 3.998∗∗∗ 5.398∗∗∗ 4.994∗∗∗ 4.945∗∗∗
[0.308] [0.368] [0.348] [0.376] [0.346] [0.392]
Work time in D22 2.385∗∗∗ 2.443∗∗∗ 2.518∗∗∗ 3.558∗∗∗ 3.709∗∗∗ 3.841∗∗∗
[0.158] [0.158] [0.166] [0.179] [0.172] [0.173]
Work time in D23 2.089∗∗∗ 1.982∗∗∗ 2.380∗∗∗ 3.383∗∗∗ 3.619∗∗∗ 3.596∗∗∗
[0.193] [0.217] [0.236] [0.195] [0.197] [0.207]
Work time in D24 0.095 1.447 0.749 2.013∗∗∗ 6.293∗∗∗ 3.483∗∗∗
[0.572] [0.936] [0.838] [0.608] [1.207] [1.013]
Work time in D25 2.300∗∗∗ 2.404∗∗∗ 2.449∗∗∗ 3.307∗∗∗ 3.221∗∗∗ 3.272∗∗∗
[0.214] [0.230] [0.226] [0.221] [0.229] [0.233]
Work time in D26 2.244∗∗∗ 2.423∗∗∗ 2.794∗∗∗ 3.950∗∗∗ 4.785∗∗∗ 5.015∗∗∗
[0.360] [0.403] [0.409] [0.410] [0.442] [0.464]
Work time in D27 1.911∗∗∗ 1.615∗∗∗ 1.667∗∗∗ 2.971∗∗∗ 2.762∗∗∗ 3.395∗∗∗
[0.225] [0.215] [0.221] [0.224] [0.230] [0.235]
Work time in D28 3.270∗∗∗ 3.468∗∗∗ 3.186∗∗∗ 4.024∗∗∗ 4.027∗∗∗ 4.219∗∗∗
[0.481] [0.488] [0.505] [0.504] [0.487] [0.467]
Work time in D29 2.373∗∗∗ 2.499∗∗∗ 3.004∗∗∗ 3.804∗∗∗ 3.715∗∗∗ 4.272∗∗∗
[0.193] [0.207] [0.194] [0.195] [0.201] [0.212]
Constant 6.080∗∗∗ 6.124∗∗∗ 6.255∗∗∗ 5.620∗∗∗ 5.622∗∗∗ 5.698∗∗∗
[0.098] [0.093] [0.092] [0.113] [0.112] [0.118]
Observations 162,886 154,719 169,697 215,524 209,072 222,012
R-squared 0.105 0.104 0.103 0.128 0.132 0.134
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Table A4: Earning Loss Explained by Demographics, Fatigue and Market Knowledge
Dependent Variable Earning loss at decision level
All Regular Relief
(1) (2) (3)
Familiarity with optimal market -4.1145∗∗∗ -3.8186∗∗∗ -4.3332∗∗∗
[0.1679] [0.2187] [0.2455]
Familiarity with current market -0.6465∗∗∗ -0.7424∗∗∗ -0.5964∗∗∗
[0.0446] [0.0671] [0.0598]
Short-trip preference -0.3973∗∗∗ -0.5208∗∗∗ -0.3148∗∗∗
[0.0632] [0.0995] [0.0810]
Current cumulative working time (log) 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗
[0.0026] [0.0038] [0.0035]
Current earning time (log) -0.0465∗∗∗ -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0551∗∗∗
[0.0047] [0.0073] [0.0060]
Decision before a break 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0517∗∗∗ 0.0128
[0.0074] [0.0109] [0.0099]
Total number of phone bookings -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Pick-up probabilities Yes Yes Yes
Day of week and starting hour FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,604,432 1,039,133 1,565,299
R-squared 0.0781 0.0813 0.0764
Note: The estimation sample includes all observations from May to June. Data in April are
used to derive the driver-specific characteristics. Familiarity variables and short-trip preference
are defined percentage time the driver spent in each relevant district in April. Pick-up
probability and phone bookings are controlled at both current and optimal markets. Clustered
standard errors by drivers are shown in brackets. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Earning Loss Explained by Strategic Thinking and Risk Preference
Dependent Variable Earning loss at decision level
All Regular Relief
(1) (2) (3)
Level 0 decision -4.7443∗∗∗ -5.8554∗∗∗ -4.2446∗∗∗
[0.2527] [0.3919] [0.3009]
Level ≥ 1 decision -3.9820∗∗∗ -5.2867∗∗∗ -3.4087∗∗∗
[0.4240] [0.5719] [0.5306]
Earning risk minimizing decision -0.2487∗∗ -0.2135 -0.2324∗
[0.1197] [0.2124] [0.1405]
Pick up prob. maximizing decision -0.6431∗∗ -0.7418∗ -0.4591
[0.3110] [0.4327] [0.4023]
Short-trip preference -0.2130∗∗∗ -0.2905∗∗∗ -0.1633∗∗∗
[0.0444] [0.0676] [0.0566]
Current cumulative working time (log) -0.0025 -0.0041 -0.0001
[0.0023] [0.0034] [0.0031]
Current cumulative earning (log) 0.0085∗∗ 0.0229∗∗∗ 0.0008
[0.0040] [0.0061] [0.0053]
Decision before a break 0.0680∗∗∗ 0.1026∗∗∗ 0.0458∗∗∗
[0.0059] [0.0100] [0.0072]
Total number of phone bookings -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Experience, age and education controls Yes Yes Yes
Pick-up probabilities Yes Yes Yes
Day of week and starting hour FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,604,432 1,039,133 1,565,299
R-squared 0.0476 0.0527 0.0445
Note: The estimation sample includes all observations from May to June. Data in April are
used to derive the driver-specific characteristics. Level-k decision variables are proportions
of the driver’s decisions in April corresponding to level-k. Similarly, the earning-risk-minimizing
-decision variable and the pick-up-probability-maximizing-decision variable are the proportions
the driver’s decisions in April corresponding to earning-risk-minimizing decision and pick-up-
probability-maximizing decision respectively. Pick-up probability and phone bookings are
controlled at both current and optimal markets. Clustered standard errors by drivers are
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H0: There is no difference between the two distributions 
K-S test exact p-value=0.263
H0: There is no difference between the two distributions 
K-S test exact p-value=0.998
H0: There is no difference between the two distributions 
K-S test exact p-value=0.791
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Figure A4: Number of Pick-ups and Drop-offs by District
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